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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
C.H., as guardian ad litem of Z.H., appeals from an order 
of the District Court dismissing her complaint in this civil 
rights action. The complaint alleges that the First 
Amendment rights of Z.H., a minor, were violated on two 
occasions: once when he was a kindergarten student and 
once when he was in the first grade.1  The District Court 
held, inter alia, that it had no jurisdiction over the 
defendant Department of Education of the State of New 
Jersey and that no constitutional violation occurred on 
either occasion. It entered judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of all of the defendants. 
 
This en banc court finds itself equally divided on the 
issue of whether judgment was properly entered in favor of 
the defendants other than the Department of Education on 
the First Amendment claim arising from the first grade 
episode. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's 
judgments in favor of those defendants on that basis 
without further explication. While we agree with the District 
Court that the Department of Education is immune from 
suit in a federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, we 
will vacate the judgment in its favor and remand with 
instructions to dismiss the claims against it for lack of 
jurisdiction. With respect to the other defendants, we 
conclude that the complaint fails to state claims against 
them arising out of the kindergarten episode. We will 
remand, however, to give C.H. an opportunity to cure the 
deficiencies we have identified if she is able to do so. 
 
I. 
 
The following facts are affirmatively alleged in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The complaint purports to state claims under both the Free Speech 
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Given our 
resolution of this appeal, it is unnecessary for us to distinguish in this 
opinion between the two theories of liability. 
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complaint. In the Fall of 1994, Z.H. was a kindergarten 
student at the Haines Elementary School, a public school, 
in Medford, New Jersey. Defendant Pratt was the principal 
of that school; defendant Johnson was the Superintendent 
of Schools in the Medford School District; and defendant 
Medford Township Board of Education owned and operated 
the public schools in the District. Defendant Klagholtz was 
the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey. 
He and defendant Department of Education of the State of 
New Jersey are alleged to be responsible for the general 
supervision of public education in the State. Defendant 
Oliva was to be Z.H.'s first grade teacher in the following 
year and was not involved in the relevant events in 1994. 
 
In the spirit of the Thanksgiving holiday, Z.H.'s teacher 
asked the students to make posters depicting what they 
were "thankful for." Z.H. produced a poster indicating that 
he was thankful for Jesus. The allegations with respect to 
the remainder of the kindergarten episode are as follows: 
 
        13. Z.H.'s poster along with those of his classmates 
       were subsequently placed on display in the hallway of 
       the school. Subsequently, employees of Defendant, 
       Township of Medford Board of Education, removed 
       Z.H.'s poster because of its religious theme. 
 
        14. Said removal occurred on a day when Z.H.'s 
       kindergarten teacher was absent. Upon her return, 
       said teacher properly returned the poster to the 
       hallway, although this time the poster was placed at a 
       less prominent location at the end of said hallway. 
 
        15. Both Z.H. and C.H. were made aware of the 
       removal of the poster because of its religious theme. 
 
The removal is thus twice alleged to have been motivated 
by the religious theme of the poster, but that removal is 
alleged to have been done by unidentified "employees of 
Defendant." On the other hand, the restoration to a "less 
prominent location" is attributed to Z.H.'s teacher who is 
not joined as a defendant and who is not alleged to have 
acted because of the poster's religious theme. None of the 
defendants in the case is alleged to have participated in, or 
been aware of, the decision to remove the poster or to 
restore it to a "less prominent location." 
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II. 
 
The Department of Education is a state agency and as 
such is immune from suit in a federal court without regard 
to the nature of the relief sought. See Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-101 (1984). 
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that this suit 
could not go forward against the Department of Education. 
Having concluded that it was immune from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment, however, it should have dismissed 
the claim against the Department for want of jurisdiction, 
rather than entering judgment in its favor. See Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Wheeling & 
Erie Ry. Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n, 141 F.3d 88, 91 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
III. 
 
It is, of course, well established that a defendant in a civil 
rights case cannot be held responsible for a constitutional 
violation which he or she neither participated in nor 
approved. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 
1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 
F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995). There is no vicarious, 
respondeat superior liability under S 1983. See Monell v. 
New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978); Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 441 (3d 
Cir. 1999). Moreover, a school board can be held 
responsible for a constitutional violation of a teacher only if 
the violation occurred as a result of a policy, custom or 
practice established or approved by the board. See Monell, 
436 U.S. at 694; Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, No. 
99-3280, 2000 WL 223590, at *7 (3d Cir. 2000); Hopp, 194 
F.3d at 441. 
 
As we have noted, there is no allegation that Oliva, Pratt, 
Johnson or the Board of Education participated in or 
approved the removal or restoration decisions and the 
Board of Education is not alleged to have established or 
approved any policy, custom or practice. Similarly, it is not 
alleged that the State Commissioner established or 
approved a policy, practice or custom causally related to 
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the removal or restoration decisions. Rather the allegation 
as to the Commissioner is that he "failed to exercise [his] 
supervisory powers in a fashion which would protect the 
constitutional rights of students such as Z.H." (A. 11). 
 
As the District Court recognized, a state official who is 
acting in violation of the United States Constitution can be 
sued for prospective equitable relief. See Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123 (1908). A state official may be held 
responsible under S 1983 for exercising or failing to exercise 
supervisory authority, however, only if that official "has 
exhibited deliberate indifference to the plight of the person 
deprived." Sample v. Diedes, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 
1989). Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting a failure to 
supervise claim must not only identify a specific 
supervisory practice that the defendant failed to employ, he 
or she must also allege "both (1) contemporaneous 
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior 
pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under 
which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have 
communicated a message of approval." Bonenberger v. 
Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d 
Cir. 1988). Here the sole allegation against the 
Commissioner is that he failed to supervise in a way that 
would have prevented the alleged violation of Z.H.'s First 
Amendment rights. That is insufficient. 
 
IV. 
 
This is not a situation in which the complaint is merely 
lacking in factual detail. It is a situation in which the fair 
inference from the facts alleged is that the defendants did 
not play any role in the challenged decisions and there is 
no allegation, even conclusory, to the contrary. Accordingly, 
this is a situation in which it is very likely that the Court 
is being asked to resolve an important issue of 
constitutional law that is a purely hypothetical one as far 
as these parties are concerned. 
 
While the removal is alleged to have been motivated by 
the religious theme of the poster, it is not alleged that the 
removal occurred as a result of any school policy against 
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the exhibition of religious material. To the contrary, the 
affirmatively alleged prompt return of the poster to the 
display vouches for the absence of such a policy. Also 
noticeably absent from the complaint is any allegation that 
the restoration to "a less prominent place" was the result of 
a school policy or an authoritative directive from Principal 
Pratt or Superintendent Johnson. To the contrary, C.H.'s 
brief before the District Court indicates that there was no 
such policy or directive and that the placement was the 
product of an ad hoc "compromise" among peers. The brief 
explains C.H.'s understanding that Z.H.'s "kindergarten 
teacher on her own initiative returned the poster to public 
display, but . . . as a compromise to those who were against 
any display of the poster, agreed to place it in a less 
prominent position." Plaintiff 's Brief in Opposition at 1 n.2. 
 
We decline to address the tendered constitutional issue 
under these circumstances. On the other hand, we 
acknowledge that the absence of allegations of participation 
was not pressed in support of the defendants' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and that, if it had been, C.H. 
would undoubtedly have been given an opportunity to 
amend her complaint. Moreover, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that C.H. might be able to establish through 
amendment that an actual case or controversy exists 
between the parties. Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the prudent course is to remand this case to 
the District Court with instructions to provide C.H. with an 
opportunity to amend. If she is unable to allege personal 
involvement in the kindergarten episode on the part of any 
of the defendants, the complaint should be dismissed. If 
personal involvement is alleged, the District Court should 
conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
We will vacate the judgment of the District Court entered 
in favor of the Department of Education and will remand 
with instructions to dismiss the complaint against it for 
want of jurisdiction. We will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court with respect to the claims against the 
remaining defendants arising from the events occurring 
during Z.H.'s first grade year. We will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court with respect to the remaining claims 
and will remand with instructions to provide C.H. an 
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opportunity to amend the allegations of her complaint 
concerning them. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, with whom MANSMANN, Circuit 
Judge, joins, dissenting: 
 
In accordance with tradition, I will not comment on the 
decision of the en banc court insofar as it affirms, by an 
equally divided vote, the judgment of the District Court 
regarding Zachary Hood's1 wish to read the story, "A Big 
Family," to his class. I must write, however, regarding the 
full court's decision with respect to Zachary's Thanksgiving 
poster. Instead of confronting the First Amendment issue 
that is squarely presented by that incident, the court ducks 
the issue and bases its decision on a spurious procedural 
ground never raised by the defendants--viz., that the 
complaint does not adequately allege facts providing a basis 
for holding any of the defendants responsible for the 
treatment of the poster. I dissent. 
 
I. 
 
The incident concerning the Thanksgiving poster 
occurred when Zachary was in kindergarten at the Haines 
Elementary School in Medford, New Jersey. As alleged in 
the complaint, this is what happened. With Thanksgiving 
approaching, Zachary's teacher told the students to make 
posters depicting what they were "thankful for." Zachary 
drew a picture of Jesus. All of the pupils' posters, including 
Zachary's, were initially hung in the hallway of the school, 
but on a day when Zachary's teacher was absent, unnamed 
employees of the school board removed the poster"because 
of its religious theme." The next day, Zachary's teacher put 
the picture back on the wall -- but this time in a less 
prominent spot at the end of the hall. 
 
The following year another, similar incident occurred 
while Zachary was in Grace Oliva's first-grade class at the 
same school. As a reward for achieving a certain degree of 
proficiency in reading, Ms. Oliva invited students to bring 
in a book to read to the class. "The only condition on the 
selection was that it would be reviewed first by[Ms. Oliva] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the complaint identified Zachary and his mother, Carol 
Hood, by initials, rather than by name, their names are used in the 
plaintiff 's most recent brief, and I therefore use them in this opinion. 
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to insure that its length [and] complexity were appropriate 
for the first grade." Zachary qualified to read a story to the 
class and brought to school a book entitled The Beginner's 
Bible: Timeless Children's Stories. Zachary wanted to read 
the following story, called "A Big Family," which represents 
an adaptation of the story of the reconciliation of Jacob and 
Esau from Genesis 29:1-33:20: 
 
       Jacob traveled far away to his uncle's house. He 
       worked for his uncle taking care of sheep. While he 
       was there, Jacob got married. He had twelve sons. 
       Jacob's big family lived on his uncle's land for many 
       years. But Jacob wanted to go back home. One day, 
       Jacob packed up all his animals and his family and 
       everything he had. They traveled all the way back home 
       to where Esau lived. Now Jacob was afraid that Esau 
       might still be angry at him. So he sent presents to 
       Esau. He sent servants who said, "Please don't be 
       angry anymore." But Esau wasn't angry. He ran to 
       Jacob. He hugged and kissed him. He was happy to see 
       his brother again. 
 
Ms. Oliva told Zachary that he could not read this story 
to the class "because of its religious content." Instead, she 
permitted Zachary to read the story to her in private. Other 
students, however, were allowed to read their favorite 
stories to the class. 
 
Upon learning of this incident, Zachary's mother, Carol 
Hood, spoke with Ms. Oliva, who informed her that Zachary 
could not read the story to the class "because it might 
influence other students." Ms. Hood next spoke with Gail 
Pratt, the school principal, who said that reading the story 
"was the equivalent of `praying'." Noting that she had 
received complaints in the past, Ms. Pratt stated that the 
story "might upset Muslim, Hindu or Jewish students." She 
added that there was "no place in the public school for the 
reading of the Bible" and advised: " `[M]aybe you should 
consider taking your child out of public school, since you 
don't appear to be public school material.' " Ms. Pratt noted 
that "her position was fully supported by various legal 
authorities." Ms. Hood made an appointment to speak 
again with Zachary's teacher, but she did not appear. Ms. 
Hood's lawyer then contacted Patrick Johnson, the school 
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superintendent, and demanded that Zachary be allowed to 
read the story to the class and that Ms. Pratt apologize for 
her conduct. The superintendent did not respond. 
 
Ms. Hood, in her individual capacity and as Zachary's 
guardian ad litem, filed a two-count complaint in federal 
district court. Count I alleged that Ms. Oliva, Ms. Pratt, Mr. 
Johnson, and the Medford Board of Education (hereinafter 
collectively "the Medford defendants") had violated 
Zachary's constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
Count II alleged that the New Jersey Commissioner of 
Education and the New Jersey Department of Education 
had aided in this violation. Count II sought an order 
requiring the state to implement policies to protect students 
who wish to engage in the expression of religious views. 
 
The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. In 
light of the putative pleading defect on which the full court 
now relies in relation to the poster incident, it is important 
to note the basis for the Medford defendants' motion. The 
Medford defendants did not argue that there were any 
formal defects in the complaint, and they certainly did not 
suggest that the claim concerning the poster should be 
dismissed because it did not state a basis for holding them 
responsible for the treatment of the poster. On the 
contrary, the Medford defendants acknowledged that 
judgment on the pleadings would be proper only if"the 
plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle [her] 
to relief." Brief in Support of Rule 12(c) Motion for 
Judgment on Pleadings on Behalf of Defendants Medford 
Township Board of Education, Grace Oliva, Gail Pratt and 
Patrick Johnson. They also acknowledged, for purposes of 
the motion, that they were responsible for the removal and 
replacement of the poster, and they argued that their 
conduct was fully justified. They stated: 
 
       For purposes of the instant motion only, defendants do 
       not dispute plaintiff 's contention that the temporary 
       removal and subsequent relocation of plaintiff 's poster 
       was related to the poster's religious theme. 
 
Id. at 19. They continued: 
 
       [D]efendants merely relocated the poster to another 
       location in the same hallway. Plaintiff cannot 
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       reasonably contend that defendants inhibited religion 
       by temporarily removing the poster and subsequently 
       relocating it to another location in the same hallway. 
 
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). In their reply brief in support 
of their motion, the Medford defendants stated: 
 
       [T]he Medford Defendants' temporary removal and 
       almost immediate return of the poster to the hallway 
       wall supports the inescapable conclusion that no such 
       hostility existed. 
 
Medford Defendant's 12(c) Reply Br. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 
In granting the defendants' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the District Court did not rely upon-- or even 
note -- any formal defect in the complaint. On the contrary, 
like the Medford defendants themselves, the District Court 
accepted the fact that the Medford defendants were 
responsible for the removal of the poster and its relocation 
to a less conspicuous spot. The District Court stated: 
 
       The Medford defendants concede that the poster was 
       removed and relocated because it had a religious 
       theme. 
 
C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 354 (D.N.J. 1997). 
However, the Court held that the Medford defendants did 
not violate Zachary's right to freedom of expression because 
"relocating the poster of Jesus . . . [was] reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 353. 
 
On appeal, the Medford defendants took the same 
approach that they had in the District Court. They did not 
assert that there were any formal defects in the complaint, 
and they did not dispute, for purposes of the appeal, that 
they were responsible for the treatment of the poster. 
Rather, they argued that their removal and relocation of the 
poster were constitutional. The thrust of their argument 
was as follows: 
 
        The educators of Z.H.'s school were correctly 
       concerned about the impact of the prominent display of 
       Z.H.'s poster upon their young students. Students of a 
       non-Christian faith may have felt that the prominent 
       display of the poster constituted a comment by the 
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       school on the correctness of Christianity or an 
       endorsement of the Christian religion. These children 
       may also have felt the prominent display of the poster 
       to be a negative comment on their own religious beliefs. 
       The Medford defendants should not be liable . . . for 
       their concerns about the impact of Z.H.'s poster on his 
       fellow classmates. 
 
Medford Appellees' Br. at 14. 
 
Both of the opinions issued by the panel before rehearing 
en banc was granted affirmed the District Court on the 
merits; neither was based upon -- or even hinted at -- any 
formal defects in the complaint. The first opinion was 
unpublished and disposed of the claims relating to"A Big 
Family" and the poster in less than two full typewritten 
pages. After the plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing en banc, 
the panel granted rehearing and issued a for-publication 
opinion. C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999). Like the 
Medford defendants' brief, this opinion did not dispute that 
the Medford defendants were responsible for the removal 
and relocation of the poster to a less prominent spot. The 
opinion stated that "the issue to be resolved is whether the 
school's decision to temporarily remove Z.H.'s poster was 
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern." Id. 
at 175. In striking contrast with the position taken in the 
opinion of the en banc court, the panel opinion never 
disputed that the Medford defendants were responsible for 
the treatment of the poster. Indeed, the for-publication 
panel opinion deferred to the professional judgment of the 
school officials that the temporary removal of the poster 
was appropriate for pedagogical reasons! The panel wrote: 
 
       Given the sensitivity of the issues raised by student 
       religious expression, coupled with the notable 
       immaturity of the students involved and the relatively 
       public display of the posters in the school hallway, the 
       school's temporary removal of the poster does not 
       violate the First Amendment rights of the student 
       artist. As we have indicated, decisions on issues of this 
       kind necessarily involve fact-sensitive exercises of 
       discretion by school authorities and reservation of a 
       brief period for deliberation is thus a measure 
       reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 
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Id. (emphasis added). Plainly, the panel could not have 
deferred to the professional judgment of the school 
authorities if, as the full court now believes, the complaint 
does not even allege that those officials had any role in the 
poster's removal. 
 
The for-publication panel opinion took a similar approach 
with respect to the relocation of the poster to a less 
prominent spot. The panel observed: "We decline plaintiff 's 
invitation to require the District Court to review and 
regulate the school's placement of its students' artwork." Id. 
at 176 n.3 (emphasis added). 
 
Following the issuance of this panel decision, the court 
granted rehearing en banc and permitted the parties to 
submit supplemental briefs. Once again, the Medford 
defendants did not contend that the District Court's 
decision regarding the poster should be affirmed on the 
ground that the complaint did not adequately allege that 
they were responsible for the poster's treatment. On the 
contrary, they defended the treatment of the poster on the 
merits, arguing as follows: 
 
       Z.H. did not have any particular right to have his 
       poster displayed in a prominent location and a 
       prominent display of the poster may have the 
       impermissible effect of conveying a message of 
       endorsement of Christianity. The Medford Defendant's 
       (sic) actions were thus reasonably related to legitimate 
       pedagogical concerns, namely the concern that their 
       young charges might have construed . . . the 
       prominent display of Z.H.'s poster as the school's 
       approval of Z.H.'s religion. 
 
Medford Appellees' Supplemental Br. at 9. 
 
The en banc court heard extensive oral argument. Not 
one word was mentioned about the supposed failure of the 
complaint to plead in sufficient detail the basis for holding 
the Medford defendants liable for the removal and 
relocation of the poster. 
 
Despite all this, the full court sua sponte raises the issue 
of the adequacy of the complaint and, without even 
permitting the plaintiff to comment on this new issue, the 
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court declines to reach the merits of the appeal and instead 
remands the case so that the plaintiff can seek to amend 
the complaint. 
 
II. 
 
A. Under the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the existing complaint is adequate. 
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief," and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), 
"[a]ll pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial 
justice." A complaint must only give "fair notice of what the 
plaintiff 's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). "[A] complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless 
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief." Id. at 45-46; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 236 (1974).2 
 
       [P]leadings under the rules simply may be a general 
       summary of the party's position that is sufficient to 
       advise the other party of the event being sued upon, to 
       provide some guidance as to what was decided for 
       purposes of res judicata, and to indicate whether the 
       case should be tried to the court or to a jury. No more 
       is demanded of the pleadings than this. 
 
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 1202 at 69-70(1969)(footnote omitted). 
 
Under these standards, the complaint in this case 
adequately avers a basis for holding the Medford 
defendants responsible for the treatment of the poster, i.e., 
its temporary removal and subsequent relocation to a less 
conspicuous place in the hall. While I think that the 
complaint adequately asserts a claim against all of the 
Medford defendants, I will focus on one defendant, Gail 
Pratt, the school principal. I do this because the sufficiency 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This same principle governs a motion under Rule 12(c). 5A C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and ProcedureS 1368 at 494-95 & n.34 
(2000 Supp.)(citing cases). 
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of the complaint with respect to her is clear and because, 
if that is so, the court must confront the merits of the 
plaintiff 's First Amendment claim whether or not the 
allegations pertaining to the other defendants are also 
adequate. 
 
The complaint in this case alleges that "employees of 
Defendant, Township of Medford Board of Education, 
removed [Zachary's] poster because of its religious theme" 
on a day when Zachary's regular teacher was not present. 
The complaint also alleges that the next day Zachary's 
teacher put the poster back up on the wall, but in a less 
conspicuous spot at the end of the hall. Furthermore, the 
complaint avers facts from which it may be reasonably 
inferred that Pratt had received complaints about religious 
expression in the school (see Complaint para. 21), had 
consulted "legal authorities" regarding the issue (id.), and 
had developed a "position" that was not receptive to such 
expression. Id. (" `[M]aybe you[Carol Hood] should consider 
taking your child out of public school, since you don't 
appear to be public school material.' "). In view of these 
allegations, it cannot be said "beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of h[er] claim 
which would entitle h[er] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 
Pratt could be held responsible if she directed that the 
poster be treated as it was or if they knew about and 
acquiesced in the treatment. See, e.g. , Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997); Baker v. 
Monroe Twp, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995). Pratt is 
portrayed in the complaint as a person with a strong and 
well-developed "position" about religious expression in her 
school. A poster of Jesus was put up in the hall of her 
elementary school by one of the teachers under her 
supervision. On a day when this teacher was away, the 
poster was taken down because of its religious content by 
unidentified school board employees. Then the next day, 
the regular teacher, having regained possession of the 
poster, put it back on the wall, but in a less noticeable spot 
than the one she had initially selected. Under modern 
pleading rules, these allegations are surely sufficient to 
assert a claim that Pratt knew about and acquiesced in 
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these sensitive events that went on over a period of days in 
her own school and that most likely occasioned discussion 
and, perhaps, controversy. Pratt's papers in the District 
Court and on appeal make it clear that she well understood 
the claim that was asserted against her, and for purposes 
of her motion for judgment on the pleadings, she did not 
dispute her involvement. Thus, the complaint adequately 
asserted a claim against her. 
 
B. But even if it did not, why should our court sitting en 
banc reach this pleading issue? The defendants did not 
move to dismiss the complaint based on a pleading defect. 
The District Court did not dismiss the complaint on such a 
ground. The defendants did not raise any pleading issue on 
appeal. "We do not generally consider issues not raised by 
the parties," Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. 
Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc), and 
there is no good reason for us to raise a pleading issue sua 
sponte in this case. The only result of the court's approach 
is likely to be delay, expense for the parties, and a waste of 
judicial resources. 
 
On remand, the plaintiff will be able to cure the putative 
defect in the complaint simply by alleging that Pratt knew 
about and acquiesced in the treatment of the poster and by 
specifying that this allegation is "likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11(b)(4). 
Based solely on the facts already recited in the complaint, 
such an allegation would unquestionably be proper. 
 
If the plaintiff amends the complaint by adding such an 
allegation, the District Court will have no basis for 
dismissing the complaint on a pleading ground, and thus 
the District Court will be required once again to decide 
whether the complaint states a valid First Amendment 
claim. The District Court has already ruled on this 
question, and since our Court's disposition of the current 
appeal provides no new guidance, the District Court will 
presumably adhere to its prior reasoning. The plaintiff will 
then be able to appeal, and the precise issue that the full 
court now avoids will be back. I see no reason for this 
wasteful procedure. 
 
                                17 
  
The Court justifies its approach as follows. According to 
the Court, "[t]his is not a situation in which the complaint 
is merely lacking in factual detail." Maj. Op. at 6. "It is a 
situation in which the fair inference from the facts alleged 
is that the defendants did not play any role in the 
challenged decisions and there is no allegation, even 
conclusory, to the contrary." Id. Apparently it is the Court's 
belief that, on remand, the plaintiff will "very likely" be 
unwilling to allege that Pratt knew about and acquiesced in 
the treatment of the poster and that the claim regarding the 
poster will be dismissed. This is what I understand the 
Court to mean when it writes that "it is very likely that the 
Court is being asked to resolve an important issue of 
constitutional law that is a purely hypothetical one as far 
as these parties are concerned." Id. Ifind the Court's 
discussion baffling. 
 
As previously noted, if the plaintiff and her attorneys 
know no more about the treatment of the poster than is 
already alleged in the complaint, they have a more than 
adequate basis for adding the allegation needed to satisfy 
the Court's concern. The Court seems to think, however, 
that Pratt in fact did not know about and acquiesce in the 
treatment of the poster, that the plaintiff and/or her 
attorneys know this, and that they will accordingly be 
unwilling to allege that Pratt was involved. 
 
Nothing in the record supports the Court's apparent 
belief, and there is much that points in the other direction. 
As noted, Pratt has not claimed that she lacked 
responsibility for the treatment of the poster. Moreover, 
since the plaintiff 's attorneys are presumably familiar with 
the legal standard for holding Pratt responsible, and since 
they have vigorously litigated the claim against her in the 
District Court and on appeal, they presumably are not 
aware of facts showing that Pratt had no involvement in the 
incident. 
 
In support of its curious view, the Court cites a footnote 
in a brief submitted by the plaintiff to the District Court. 
The footnote states in pertinent part: 
 
        Although not specifically stated in the pleadings, 
       Plaintiffs will be prepared to show, if this matter 
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       proceeds to trial, that the kindergarten teacher was of 
       the view that the poster in question was an extremely 
       appropriate response to the assignment, that in part 
       because of how well the poster had been done, it was 
       given a prominent location next to the door of the 
       kindergarten room, and that the kindergarten teacher 
       on her own initiative returned the poster to public 
       display, but that as a compromise to those who were 
       against any display of the poster, agreed to place it in 
       a less prominent position. 
 
Plaintiff 's Brief in Opposition to Rule 12(c) Motion at 1 n.2 
(emphasis added). 
 
Nothing in this passage suggests that the plaintiff will be 
unwilling to allege that Pratt knew about and acquiesced in 
the allegedly discriminatory removal and relocation of the 
poster. The passage says nothing whatsoever about the 
removal of the poster. As for the replacement of the poster 
in a less conspicuous spot, while the passage does say that 
the new location "was a compromise to those who were 
against any display of the poster," the passage does not 
reveal who these opponents were. Pratt might have been 
one of them. She might have insisted that the poster be re- 
hung, if at all, in a less noticeable spot. Or, faced with a 
dispute among her teachers, she might have brokered a 
compromise to that effect. In either event, if she knew 
about and acquiesced in the discriminatory treatment of 
the poster because of its religious theme, she could be held 
responsible. 
 
If the Court seriously believes that the plaintiff will be 
unwilling on remand to make the necessary allegation, the 
Court could ask the plaintiff 's attorneys to proffer the 
amendment that they would make. The Court, however, has 
refused to take that step. The Court simply does not want 
to confront Zachary's First Amendment claim. Whatever the 
Court thinks about the validity or importance of that claim, 
however, it is entitled to be treated in accordance with the 
same procedural rules that we apply to the claims of other 
litigants. 
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III. 
 
A. I will therefore address the issue that the en banc 
court evades: whether Zachary's constitutional right to 
freedom of expression was violated if, as the complaint 
alleges, his poster was given less favorable treatment than 
it would have received had its content been secular rather 
than religious.3 
 
I would hold that discriminatory treatment of the poster 
because of its "religious theme" would violate the First 
Amendment. Specifically, I would hold that public school 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The issue here is not, as the District Court thought, whether Zachary 
had a "constitutional right to have the poster of Jesus displayed in any 
particular location" or to have it "displayed prominently" in the school. 
C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F.Supp. at 353, 355. The issue is whether he was 
entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment. Nor is the issue, as the panel 
suggested, whether the defendants were entitled to remove the poster for 
"a brief period of deliberation." C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d at 175. Nowhere 
in the complaint -- or for that matter in the answer -- is it alleged that 
the poster was removed for this reason. 
 
Nor, at this stage, is the question whether Zachary actually "suffered 
any compensable damages." Br. Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish 
Congress, Anti-Defamation League and Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State ("Amicus Br.") at 2. This case never progressed 
beyond the pleading stage. The complaint alleged that Zachary suffered 
emotional distress and anguish as a result of the defendants' actions, 
Complaint para. 27, and for now, that allegation is enough. Nor is the 
issue whether injunctive relief would be appropriate if a constitutional 
violation is ultimately found. See Amicus Br. at 4-5. At this stage it is 
sufficient that the complaint states a live claim for some form of relief 
-- 
and it clearly does. 
 
Nor is the issue whether Pratt or Johnson is entitled to qualified 
immunity. Although this argument was asserted in the Medford 
defendants' supplemental appellate brief, it was not raised in the 
district 
court in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, and it was not 
addressed by the district court. Under these circumstances, I would not 
reach the issue now. Moreover, even if we were to entertain the qualified 
immunity argument at this time, we would still be required, as the first 
step of our analysis, to decide whether the complaint stated a First 
Amendment claim. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 (1982). And of course the qualified 
immunity defense would not apply to the school board in its official 
capacity. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 639-650 (1980). 
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students have the right to express religious views in class 
discussion or in assigned work, provided that their 
expression falls within the scope of the discussion or the 
assignment and provided that the school's restriction on 
expression does not satisfy strict scrutiny. This conclusion 
follows from the following two propositions: first, even in a 
"closed forum," governmental "viewpoint discrimination" 
must satisfy strict scrutiny and, second, disfavoring speech 
because of its religious nature is viewpoint discrimination. 
 
B. Public schools are government property, and "the 
Government `no less than the private owner of property, 
has power to preserve the property under its control for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated.' " Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 
((1985) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)). 
The Supreme Court "has adopted a forum analysis as a 
means of determining when the Government's interest in 
limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose 
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property 
for other purposes." Id. Consequently, government's ability 
to regulate speech on its own property often varies 
depending on the particular "forum" involved. In a 
"nonpublic forum," government may regulate expression 
much more extensively than in a "public forum," whether 
"traditional" or "dedicated." See, e.g., Perry Education Assn. 
v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 954 (1983); 
Brody v. Sprang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1992). Even 
in a nonpublic forum, however, where the greatest 
restrictions are permissible, "viewpoint discrimination" is 
not allowed unless it passes the highest scrutiny. See, e.g., 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 
508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; 
Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46; Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Brody, 957 F.2d at 1117.4 As Justice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There is some support in Supreme Court opinions for the proposition 
that viewpoint-based restrictions are per se unconstitutional, see, e.g., 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984), but 
other cases show that strict scrutiny applies. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City 
of 
St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a regulation banning "fighting words"); Capitol Square Review 
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760-761 (1995) (plurality) 
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Brennan put it in Perry: "Viewpoint discrimination is 
censorship in its purest form and government regulation 
that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the 
continued vitality of `free speech.' " Perry Education Assn, 
460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, even when 
government is regulating a category of speech, such as 
"fighting words," that could be entirely prohibited, 
government may not discriminate based on viewpoint. 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992). 
 
C. The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
discrimination based on the religious character of speech is 
viewpoint discrimination. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court 
struck down a school district policy that permitted school 
facilities to be used after school hours by a wide variety of 
groups but prohibited the use of those facilities by a group 
that wished to show a film series addressing various child- 
rearing issues from a "Christian perspective." The Court 
held that "it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to 
permit school property to be used for the presentation of all 
views about family issues and child rearing except those 
dealing with the subject from a religious standpoint." 508 
U.S. at 393-94. Likewise, in Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), 
the Court examined university guidelines that refused to 
allow a student publication, "Wide Awake," to benefit from 
the "Student Activities Fund" because the publication 
reflected a religious perspective. It held that such guidelines 
violated the First Amendment because they discriminated 
against otherwise permissible speech on the basis of 
viewpoint. The Court wrote: 
 
       It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to 
       speak of religious thought and discussion as just a 
       viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of 
       thought. The nature of our origins and destiny and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(applying strict scrutiny to a restriction on religious advocacy); Texas 
v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a law 
barring flag desecration); See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2417, 2425 n.44 (1996). 
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       their dependence upon the existence of a divine being 
       have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout 
       human history. We conclude, nonetheless, that here, 
       as in Lamb's Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the 
       proper way to interpret the University's objections to 
       Wide Awake. 
 
515 U.S. at 831. 
 
Accordingly, viewpoint discrimination is prohibited even 
in a nonpublic forum if strict scrutiny cannot be satisfied, 
and discrimination based on the religious content of speech 
is viewpoint discrimination. It follows that public school 
authorities may not discriminate against student speech 
based on its religious content if the discrimination cannot 
pass strict scrutiny. 
 
D. Recognition of this important principle would not 
interfere with the operation of the public schools or impinge 
upon the rights of other students. Public school teachers 
have the authority to specify the subjects that students 
may discuss in class and the subjects of assignments that 
students are asked to complete. See, e.g. Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 806 (subject matter may be restricted in nonpublic 
forum); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 
(1974) (same); Brody, 957 F.2d at 1117 (same). Thus, if a 
student is asked to solve a problem in mathematics or to 
write an essay on a great American poet, the student clearly 
does not have a right to speak or write about the Bible 
instead. 
 
Public school teachers may also enforce viewpoint-neutral 
rules concerning such matters as the length of an oral 
presentation or written assignment. See Brody , 957 F.2d at 
1117 (reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
allowed in nonpublic forum). If a paper is limited to 20 
pages, the school obviously may insist that all students, 
including any who wish to express a religious viewpoint, 
adhere to that rule. 
 
In the public schools, low-value speech, such as vulgar 
and offensive language, may be restricted to a greater 
extent than would otherwise be permissible. As the Court 
observed in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 683 (1986), "[s]urely it is a highly appropriate 
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function of public school education to prohibit the use of 
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."" `[T]he 
First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom 
right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket.' " 
Id. at 682 (citation omitted). 
 
Finally, a public school may even restrict speech based 
on viewpoint if it can show a compelling interest for doing 
so. In Tinker, the Court stated: "Clearly, the prohibition of 
expression of one particular opinion, at least without 
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is 
not constitutionally permissible." 393 U.S. at 511. Later, 
the Court observed that "conduct by the student, in class 
or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 513. 
Therefore, if the expression of a particular religious 
viewpoint, such as one espousing racial hatred, creates a 
sufficient threat, school authorities may intervene. 
 
Taken together, these constitutionally permissible ways of 
regulating student speech provide ample means of ensuring 
that student expression does not interfere with the effective 
operation of the schools or cause harm to other students. 
School authorities are not permitted to discriminate against 
student expression simply because of its religious 
character. 
 
E. When these principles are applied to the present case, 
it is clear that the judgment of the District Court must be 
reversed. Taking down Zachary's Thanksgiving poster and 
replacing it in a less conspicuous location because of its 
religious content was plainly viewpoint, not subject matter, 
discrimination. The subject matter of the poster was 
specified by Zachary's teacher: something for which he was 
thankful as the Thanksgiving holiday approached. His 
poster fell within the specified subject matter, and it is not 
alleged that the poster was subjected to discriminatory 
treatment because of that subject. Rather, the poster was 
allegedly given discriminatory treatment because of the 
viewpoint that it expressed, because it expressed thanks for 
Jesus, rather than for some secular thing. This was 
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quintessential viewpoint discrimination, and it was 
proscribed by the First Amendment unless the Medford 
defendants can show that allowing Zachary's poster to be 
displayed with his classmates' on a non-discriminatory 
basis would have "materially disrupt[ed] classwork or 
involve[d] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
other[ ] [students]." Tinker , 393 U.S. at 513. 
 
No such showing is evident from the pleadings, and 
nothing asserted in the Medford defendants' briefs suggests 
that they could make such a showing on remand. The 
Medford defendants contend that the treatment of 
Zachary's poster furthered the compelling interest of 
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. See Medford 
Defendants' Supplemental Br. at 27-31. It is clear, however, 
that displaying Zachary's poster would not have violated 
the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause is not 
violated when the government treats religious speech and 
other speech equally and a reasonable observer would not 
view the government practice as endorsing religion. Capitol 
Square, 515 U.S. at 763-70 (1995)(plurality); id. at 777 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). See also Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe, 120 S. Ct. 226, 2278 (2000). 
 
Here, a reasonable observer would not have viewed the 
exhibition of Zachary's Thanksgiving poster along with the 
secular posters of his classmates as an effort by the school 
to endorse religion in general or Christianity in particular. 
An art display that includes works of religious art is not 
generally interpreted as an expression of religious belief by 
the entity responsible for the display. Even the amici 
supporting the defendants acknowledge that "[d]isplay of 
student artwork with religious themes is understood to be 
the personal expression of the student and not that of the 
school." Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish 
Congress, Anti-Defamation League and Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State at 1. Furthermore, if 
there had been any danger that anyone might have 
reasonably interpreted the display of Zachary's poster in 
the hall as an effort by the school to endorse Christianity or 
religion, the school could have posted a sign explaining that 
the children themselves had decided what to draw. See 
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Capitol Square Review, 515 U.S. at 793-94 (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 
For these reasons, I see no indication in the briefs that 
the Medford defendants had a compelling reason for 
treating Zachary's Poster in the manner alleged. Zachary's 
teacher in effect asked him a question: What are you 
thankful for as Thanksgiving approaches? Zachary was 
entitled to give what he thought was the best answer. He 
was entitled to be free from pressure to give an answer 
thought by the Medford educators to be suitable for a boy 
who is "public school material." Complaint para. 21. 
 
F. In affirming the judgment of the district court, the 
panel took the position that a public school is free to 
practice viewpoint discrimination in regulating student 
speech in class and in assignments, provided only that the 
discrimination is "reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical concern." 195 F.3d at 170-72. Moreover, the 
panel held that avoiding the possibility of "resentment" by 
parents is a legitimate pedagogical concern. Id . at 175. 
According to the panel, then, if public school authorities 
could reasonably think that a student's expression of a 
particular viewpoint in a class discussion or assignment 
could cause "resentment" on the part of other students or 
parents, the school may censor the student's speech. 
 
The panel's view is radically at odds with fundamental 
First Amendment principles. As previously discussed, 
viewpoint discrimination strikes at the heart of the freedom 
of expression. And in order to restrict core First 
Amendment speech, much more is needed than the 
possibility that the speech may cause resentment. See 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407-10. This principle 
applies to speech in public schools. As the Supreme Court 
wrote in Tinker, "[a]ny word spoken in class . . . that 
deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution 
says that we must take this risk." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 737. 
Thus, "[i]n order for the State in the person of school 
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of 
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused 
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
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discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint." Id at 738. 
 
The panel's understanding of the First Amendment 
principles applicable in this case was based on one case -- 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
See 195 F.3d at 171-74. The panel viewed Hazelwood as 
providing the governing standard for "student expression 
that is part of a school curriculum," see 195 F.3d at 171, 
including things that students say (or express by other 
means, such as artwork) when they are called upon by 
their teachers to express their own thoughts or views. This 
is an incorrect interpretation of Hazelwood. Hazelwood 
involved a high school principal's censorship of articles in 
the school newspaper. The Court described the issue before 
it as concerning "educators' authority over school- 
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members 
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school." 484 U.S. at 271. The Court held 
that educators may regulate such activities "so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns." Id. at 273. While Hazelwood certainly applies to 
many things that occur in the classroom -- such as work 
on the school newspaper at issue in that case (see 484 U.S. 
at 268) -- nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its standard 
applies when a student is called upon to express his or her 
personal views in class or in an assignment. 
 
On the contrary, Hazelwood governs only those 
expressive activities that might reasonably be perceived "to 
bear the imprimatur of the school." 484 U.S. at 271. This 
understanding of Hazlewood is fortified by Rosenberger, 
where the Court wrote: 
 
       A holding that the University may not discriminate 
       based on the viewpoint of private persons whose 
       speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's 
       own speech, which is controlled by different principles. 
       See e.g., . . . Hazelwood School Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 
       U.S. 260, 270-272. 
 
515 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added). 
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Things that students express in class or in assignments 
when called upon to express their own views do not"bear 
the imprimatur of the school" Hazlewood, 484 U.S. at 271, 
and do not represent "the [school's] own speech." 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. "The proposition that schools 
do not endorse everything that they fail to censor is not 
complicated." Westside Community Bd. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 250 (1990)(opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
 
In the present case, for reasons already discussed, 
reasonable students, parents, and members of the public 
would not have perceived Zachary's poster as bearing the 
imprimatur of the school or as an expression of the school's 
own viewpoint. Thus, it is abundantly clear that Hazelwood 
has no application here. 
 
If the panel's understanding of Hazelwood were correct, 
it would lead to disturbing results. Public school students 
-- including high school students, since Hazelwood was a 
high school case -- when called upon in class to express 
their views on important subjects, could be prevented from 
expressing any views that school officials could reasonably 
believe would cause "resentment" by other students or their 
parents. If this represented a correct interpretation of the 
First Amendment, the school officials in Tinker could have 
permitted students, as part of a class discussion, to express 
views in favor of, but not against, the war in Vietnam 
because some students plainly resented the expression of 
antiwar views. See 393 U.S. at 509 n.3. Today, school 
officials could permit students to express views on only one 
side of other currently controversial issues if the banned 
expression would cause resentment by some in the school, 
as it very likely would. Such a regime is antithetical to the 
First Amendment and the form of self-government that it 
was intended to foster. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, I would hold that the District Court erred in 
granting judgment for the defendants. I would reverse and 
remand for a determination whether the Medford 
defendants did in fact treat Zachary's poster in a 
discriminatory fashion because of its religious content. And 
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if discriminatory treatment is shown, I would give the 
Medford defendants the opportunity to show that their 
actions were supported by a compelling reason and were 
narrowly tailored to serve that end. 
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